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FISCAL DEFICITS AND RELATIVE PRICES IN A GROWING WORLD ECONOMY
ABSTRACT
This paper studies the transmission of fiscal disturbances
between countries, and the effect of those disturbances on
worldwide capital intensity, in a context of growth.The model
developed to address these issues allows for the production of
both nontradable and relatively capital-intensive tradable goods;
a central finding is that factor markets can be a major channel
for the communication of fiscal policy shocks to world interest
rates, to private saving decisions, and, ultimately, to global
asset supplies and their distribution among countries.
Particular predictions of the model illustrate how changes in
public debt ratios and shifts in government spending patterns
affect resource allocation and welfare. For example, an increase
in a small country's per capita public debt leads to long-run
crowding-in of capital and the impoverishment of future
generations; a similar policy shift by a large country crowds out
capital on a global scale,impoverishesfuture domestic
generations, and has ambiguous effects abroad.
Maurice Obstfeld
National Bureau of Economic Research
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 021381.Introduction
This paper studies the longer-term dynamic effects of national fiscal
policies in a context of economic growth. Particular attention is given to
the transmission of fiscal disturbances between countries and to the effect
of those disturbances on worldwide capital intensity. The model employed
allows for the production of both nontradable and relatively capital-
intensive tradable goods. A central finding of the analysis is that factor
markets can be a major channel for the transmission of fiscal policy shocks
to interest rates, to private saving decisions, and, ultimately, to global
asset supplies and their distribution among countriea.1
The framework underlying the model is one in which the Ricardo-Barro
equivalence of public debt issue and taxation [see Barro (1974)] does not
hold. Nonequivalence arises from a factor first examined by Weil (1985):
economic growth is fueled by the birth of new households that are
unconnected with the existing households that hold the public debt.
Because current debt holders do not value the consumption of unborn
taxpayers, a fraction of the public debt proportional to the growth rate of
the population represents net wealth to existing households.
A number of authora have examined international aspects of fiacal
policiea in models where agents' intertemporal objectives and constraints
are explicitly modelled. The present effort is complementary and explores
queations of fiscal policy from a aomewhat different perspective. Frenkel
and Razin (1986a) develop a global version of Blanchard's (1985) uncertain-
lifetime setup in which the labor force and supplies of tradable and
nontradable gooda are fixed. Giovannini (1988) and Buiter (1986) use
similar modela and incorporate capital accumulation; but neither
Giovannini'a comparative steady-state analyaia nor Buiter's simulation
methodology provides an analyticalcharacterization of the world economy'a2
dynamics. Greenwood and Kimbrough (1985) focus on croas-border fiscal
transmission in the presence of capital controls.
The study that comes closest to the present one is by Persson (1985),
who uses Buiter's (1981) open-economy extension of Diamond's (1965) life-
cycle growth model to conduct a careful welfare analysis of debt policies
in a global setting. The dynamic methods used in the present paper differ
significantly from Persaon's, however, and lead to a useful alternative
perspective from which to analyze certain disturbances, in addition, the
Suiter-Persson assumption of a single good abstracts from demand-side
effects on interest rates that play a key role below. Fried and Howitt
(1988) examine a model similar to Persson's, but with capital in fixed
supply.
Some main results of my analysis illustrate the important role of
factor markets in a world economy producing nontradables as well as
tradables:
1. Lona-run crowdina in. in the long run, a small economy that
increases its steady-state ratio of real public debt to population suffers
a fall in per capita expenditure but a 1j,g in its per capita capital
stock. External debt rises, however, by more than the increase in capital.
Under the above-mentioned assumption that tradables are the capital-
intensive good, the increase in capital per worker is inevitable if the
economy's production of tradables is to cover its increased debt-servicing
requirements.
2. Global crowdina out. The preceding result may be reversed when
debt expansion is undertaken by a large country capable of affecting the
world interest rate. The reason is that a rise in any country's long-run
public-debt ratio crowds out capital globally.3
3. Government nurchases of tradables and nontradables. Government
purchaaea of nontradablea are likely to result ultimately in a lower world
capital stock and lower average world consumption than equivalent purchases
of tradsbles.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes a small-
country model and section 3 uses thst model to analyze unanticipated and
anticipated fiscal policy moves. This partial-equilibrium model is useful
for developing the intuition behind the general-equilibrium global model
set out in section 4. Section 5 studies the consequences of various fiscal
policies in a global setting. Section 6 discusses possible extensions of
the paper's analysis.
2. Model structure: Consumption and production
This section describes a small open economy with a growing population
of infinitely-lived households. Population and labor force are, by
assumption, the same. The economy's firms combine capital and labor to
produce both internationally traded goods and nontraded goods. Although
the economy's lsbor suppLy is given at any point in time (there is no
cross-border labor migration), capital is internationally mobile [as in
Mundell (1957)1. The domestic capital stock therefore can be augmented
instantaneously and without adjustment cost by external borrowing.
A. Households
At time t, a household that came into existence on date v ￿ t
(its vintaze) maximizes
U(v,t) —CcT(v,s),cN(v,s)jexp6(st)]ds.4
where & > 0 is the subjective time-preference rate, cT (cN) is consumption
of traded (nontraded) goods, and
u(cT,cN) =[(cT)M(cN)]l/(lR)(R > 0).
Since the small economy will later be embedded in a trading world
economy, it is natural to choose traded goods as the numeraire for
measuring asset stocks and factor rewards. Total household consumption
expenditure, measured in terms of traded goods, is denoted c(v,t). If q(t)
is the price of traded goods in terms of nontraded goods,
c(v,t)cT(v,t) + cN(v,t)/q(t).
The household holds financial assets a(v,t), supplies its unit
labor endowment inelastically at the wage rate w(t), and, at each moment t,
receives net transfers r(t) from the government. The assumption that these
lump-sum transfers are iia vintage-specific is reflected in the notation,
and is crucial in generating the non-Ricardian debt effects studied below.
If r(t) is the interest rate in terms of traded goods, the household
intertemporal budget constraint is
(1) Cc(v,s)exp[-f5r(z)dzjds
￿ a(v,t) + f[w(s) + r(s)]exp[-j'r(z)dz]ds.
Let h(t) denote household human wealth,5
(2) h(t)f[w(s) + r(s)]exp[-5r(z)dz]ds,
which is assumed to be positive at each moment. Then the spending plan
that maximizes lifetime welfare U(v,t) subject to (1) (assuming existence)
(3) c(v,t)£(t)[a(v,t) + h(t)].
where
(4) l/U(t) rexp(5[r(z)+(lv)(z)]dz)eXp[-6(st)/RIdS
and A denotes a percentage change. In the log case (R =1),£(t) =5.
Expenditure is divided between the two consumption goods according
to the rule
(5) cT(v,t) =vc(v,t),cN(v,t)—(l-i)q(t)c(v,t).
The expenditure shares given by (5) yield the following interpretation of
the consumption function defined by (3) and (4). Consumption spending is a
proportion of total (nonhuman plus human) wealth that depends on the
expected future path of the interest rate r(t) + (l-v)(t), that is,
the rate of interest in terms of the domestic consumption basket [see
Obstfeld (1985)1. The effect of this real interest rate on spending
depends on whether R < 1 (so that substitution effects dominate) or R > 1
(so that income effects dominate).6
B. Relative prices
Traded and nontraded goods are produced with capital and labor under
neoclassical conditions, including constant returns to scale.
Nonspecialization in production is assumed. Production technologies are
described by the per capita production functions FT(kT,nT) and
where kT (kN) is the amount of capital, per unit labor force, employed in
producing traded (nontraded) goods, and nT CnN) is the corresponding per
capita labor input. Because the above outputs and inputs are divided by
the economy's total labor force, nT ÷ nN 1
One unit of the traded good can be transformed into one unit of
installed capital with no time lag. Thus, in a small economy for which the
interest rate in terms of traded goods is given, a unique domestic wage is
determined by the zero-profit condition in tradables production.
At a world interest rate of r, the optimal capital-labor ratio in the
traded sector, xT(r), is found by equalizing the marginal product of
capital and the interest rate,
F[xT(r),l] =r
(so that xTt(r) —l/Fk[xT(r)JC0).The domestic wage in terms of
tradables, w, must then lie on the factor-price frontier,
TT T
(6) w —w(r)—F[x (r),ll —rx(r).
This locus has a negative slope equal to _xT(r).
The capital-labor ratio in nontradables, xN(qr), is the solution to7
_N N
tk[x (qr),l] =qr.
Since r determines the wage w, however, the usual Stolper-Samuelson
reasoning implies that q can be written as a function of r alone,
(7) q =q(r).
(In a sense, factor mobility is a substitute for commodity trade in this
model, because countries that are nonspecialized in the same outputs, and
that have the same production functions, will have the same relative price
of nontraded goods if they face a common world interest rate.) The
-
directionof influence of r on q depends on sectoral factor intensities.
The most natural assumption, an important one for the analysis to follow,
is that nontradables are relatively labor intensive. This factor-intensity
assumption implies that a rise in r (which lowers the wage measured in
traded goods) causes the relative price of tradables, q, to rise:
(8) q'(r) >0.
The capital-labor ratio in nontradables, xN[q(r)r], is a decreasing
function of r.2
C. Factor supplies and production
The number of households 1-1(t) in the economy grows at rate p >0,50
that if H(0) is taken to be 1, H(t) =exp(pt).The implied labor supply of
H(t), together with consumer demand, determines the level of the capital
stock and the allocation of factors between sectors.8
Equation (5) shows that household V's demand for nontradables is
cN(v,t) (l-)q(t)c(v,t). Aggregate per capita consumption spending in
the economy is defined by
(9) c(t)[c(0,t) + fexp(pv)c(v,t)dv]/H(t),
which is assumed to be positive for all t.Thus, the per capita demand for
nontradables is cN(t) =(l-')q(t)c(t).
Figure 1 illustrates the economy's production side. Let gN be per
capita government demand for nontradables. The market for nontraded goods
clears when per capita supply equals per capita demand, that is, when
(10) (l-v)q(r)c ÷ gN =nNFN(xN[q(r)rJ,l).
The NN schedule in the figure shows combinations of r and such that the
nontraded-goods market clears for given values of aggregate per capita
consumption c and government demand gN• Because a rise in r both raises
the demand for nontradables (by raising q) and lowers the capital-labor
ratio in production, employment in nontradables must expand as r rises to
maintain equilibrium. The NN schedule therefore has the positive slope
shown.
The KR schedule in the lower panel of figure 1 shows how the economy's
capital stock is determined. The per capita supply of capital, k, is








KK's slope in figure 1 reflects the assumption that nontraded goods are
relatively labor intensive. (A movement downward from the origin is a rise
in k.) Notice that a rise in the interest rate, by reducing capital-labor
ratios in both sectors, shifts KK upward.
3. Equilibrium: Deficits and dynamics
The economy's dynamic equilibrium can be described by a pair of
differential equations that govern the evolutions of aggregate consumption
and the economy's outside asset holdings. To derive these equations,
however, it is first necessary to examine the behavior of the domestic
government.
A. Government spending and finance
An infinitely-lived government consumes both types of good, financing
its purchases by levying taxes and issuing debt. If d denotes the
government's per capita debt (measured in tradables) and gT its per capita
consumption of tradables, then government debt follows the equation
(12) (t) =[r(t)
-p]d(t)+ gT(t) + g()/q() + r(t).
Assume that for all t, r(t) > p; this condition rules out dynamic
inefficiency in a world economy growing at rate p. Then the assumption
(13) limexp(-J[r(z)-p]dz)d(s) =0
confines the government within its intertemporal budget constraint; that
is, (13) restricts the present discounted value of purchases plus net10
-transfersto be no greater than initial public-sector assets. Evidence
presented by Abel et al. (1986) supports a stochastic analogue of the
dynamic efficiency assumption for the United States economy post-1929.
B. Private asset accumulation
The household budget constraint (1) implies the law of motion for
household financial assets
(v,t) =r(t)a(v,t)+w(t)+r(t)—c(v,t).
The implied law of motion for aggregate per capita assets, a(t), is
(t)—[r(t)—p]a(t)+w(t)+r(t) —c(t).
Equstion (14) follows from the assumption that newly-born households are
not altruistically linked to existing ones, so that financial assets at
birth, a(t,t), are always zero.
The law of motion for c(t) follows from definition (9) and from the
behavior of individual households. Each individual household in cohort v




c(v,t) R R q /—
[seeequations (3) and (4)]. Differentiation of (9) therefore leads to
(t)=vj(t)c(t)+p[c(t,t)—c(t)I.11
The time derivative of per capita consumption is explained by the two term
on the right-hand side above. The first term results from the fact that
the consumption of all preexisting households rises at rate r(t). The
second term arises because the consumption of new households, which are
born without financial wealth, differs from the economy-wide average.
Since average consumption is easily calculated [from (3) and (9)] to be
l(t) [a(t) + h(t)] ,whilethe consumption of a new household is (2(t)h(t),
per capita consumption evolves according to
(16) (t) =,7(t)c(t)—142(t)a(t).
If the economy consisted of a single dynasty that equalized the
consumption of all its constituent households, "marginal" and "average"
consumption would be the same and the latter would therefore grow at rate
as in the standard optimal growth literature [for example, Koopmans
(1967)]. Because the newborn are endowed at birth only with human wealth,
however, the present model implies different dynamics and, as pointed Out
by Well (1985), the possibility that Ricardo-Barro equivalence breaks down.
C. Aggregate dynamics
To simplify notation, I assume that the stocks of government debt and
capital are owned entirely by domestic residents. (Agents could always
borrow abroad to bring about this portfolio allocation without disturbing
equilibrium.) Remaining national wealth consists of net claims on
foreigners, with a per capita level denoted by f(t). Asset stock a(t) thu5
equals k(t) + f(t) + d(t), so that equation (16) becomes12
(t) =,7(t)c(t)—pQ(t)[k(t)+ f(t)] —pfl(t)d(t).
When combined, the government finance constraint (12) and the private
finance constraint (14) imply
(18) (t) + ht)=[r(t)-p}[k(t)+ f(t)] + w(t) -c(t)—gT(t)
—gN(t)/q(t)
Equations (17) and (18) determine the evolution of average consumption and
the economy's average "outside" assets, k(t) ÷ f(t). Notice that while the
latter sum is predetermined, its two components are not: it is always
possible, for example, to borrow a discrete lump of tradables abroad and
install it instantly as capital. That is why (11) always holds even though
r is fixed. Equation (18) limits the economy's accumulation of new outside
assets, however, to its overall net saving.
Under the simplifying assumption that the world interest rate is
constant at level r, q =q(r)and w —w(r)are also constant; thus, 0(t) —
r+ (6 —r)/R,and q(t) —(r—6)/R.(The condition 0 > 0, which is
necessary for the existence of an individual optimum, is assumed.) The
sign of ,determines,by (17), whether the private sector has a positive or
negative average financial-asset level in steady state.
Equations (17) and (18) now reduce to a system of nonautonomous
equations with constant coefficients. Which solution for this system is




where g(t) is total per capita government consumption measured in traded
goods.3 Expression (19) can be used to compute per capita human wealth and
thus per capita consumption c(t), which is given by
(20) c(t) (r +)(k(t)+f(t)+
+ j"[pd(s)—g(s)Jexp[—r(s—t)}ds).
It can be verified, however, that (20) is the consumption level implied by
the saddlepath solution to (17) and (18) when the two roots of that system,
r and —p +(r—6)/R,are, respectively, positive and negative. If
consumption c(t) and human wealth h(t) are positive in a steady state,
however, —p +(r—6)/R< 0, and saddlepath stability is therefore assured.4
Positive human wealth clearly requires also that government spending not be
"too large" relative to the aggregate wage bill.
Equation (20) shows that consumption responds positively to current
and prospective increases in the per capita national debt, with a
responsiveness that disappears as the growth rate •0.Accordingly,
increased deficits stimulate private consumption, other things (in
particular government consumption) equal. Equation (19) shows the reason
for this failure of Ricardo-Barro equivalence. The current per capita
public debt d(t) contributes an equal negative cc:onent to each living
individual's expected future transfers. However, this future tax burden is
partially offset by the fact that some of the taxes will be levied on other14
households that are not yet alive.5 Clearly debt issue, other things
equal, benefits existing generations at the expense of future generations.
D. A digression on the Barro-Feldstein exchange
A good illustration of the effect operating in (20) comes from
reconsidering the exchange between Barro (1976) and Feldstein (1976) over
the Ricardian equivalence proposition of Barro (1974). Feldstein argued
that in a dynamically efficient economy growing at a positive rate p, part
of the government's interest bill can be financed by issuing the new debt
needed to maintain a constant per capita debt level. Barro countered by
showing that even under this financing scheme, the present value of future
taxes on an initial debt issue of D(0) is still
C(r—,A)D(s)exp(—rs)ds —(r—p)D(0)jtexp[—(r—P)s]ds
—D(0),
and not (r—p)D(0)/r, the value suggested by Feldstein. In essence, the
present value of the new debt issued at rate p is offset by the present
value of the implied additional interest payments. Barro concluded (1976,
p. 344) that "the presence of growth in the economy (at a rate below r)
leaves unchanged the conclusion that government bonds are not net wealth."
While Barro's conclusion that government bonds are not net wealth
holds in his own model, it need not hold in the present economy, where
households do not internalize taxes levied on unborn households. When
future taxes are to be spread smong a larger set of unconnected households,
each existing household computes its own discounted tax bill under





Thus, a fraction p/r of the initial per capita debt d(O) is per capita net
wealth. This expression, however, is the same as the one implied by (19)
for the case of a constant per capita debt. The present value of the taxes
that service D(O) is of course D(O) (as Barro observed), but the fraction
of these taxes to be paid by households alive at time 0 is only
E. Diagrammatic analysis
Under further assumptions that d(t) and g(t) are constant at levels d0
and g0, the dynamics implied by equations (17) and (18) can be summarized
in a useful diagram (see figures 2a and 2b). The steady-state per capita










6Jd0 (22) (k +o
=
Rr[—p+(r—6)/R]
The two configurations shown represent the cases r < 6 (figure 2a) and
r > 6 (figure 2b). When r —6,consumption is stationary along a vertical
locus. The previous results imply that the economy travels to the steady







4. Fiscal policies in a small open economy
The framework developed so far can be used to analyze a variety of
fiscal policies. Below, the diagram introduced in the last section is
applied to changes in the per capita public debt and in government
purchases.
A. Current and anticipated changes in public debt
Equation (19) offers a full account of how changes in the per capita
public debt affect consumption. The main intuition can be derived,
however, from using figures 2a and 2b to analyze one-time changes in a
constant per capita debt level.
-
Consider,for example, a permanent unanticipated rise in debt per
capita, from d0 to d1. This change should be visualized as a gift Ad =
— d0of government bonds to the public [as in Barro (1974)] ,accompaniedby
a permanent rise (r —p)Ad/rin the present value of each household's tax
bill. The fiscal policy is associated with a permanent increase in the
government budget deficit because the flow of new debt must rise to keep
per capita debt at a higher level.
Equations (20) and (21) show that the policy shift lowers the steady-
state value of per capita consumption (to c1) and lowers long-run outside
assets [to (k +f)1].7Since the qualitative affects of the adjustment do
not depend on the sign of r —8,only the case r >6is illustrated (in
figure 3).
Consumption rises sharply (and saving thus falls) as the economy jumps
from its initial equilibrium at point A to point B on the new ssddlepath.
The issue of a new debt thus has an initially expansionary impact.











moves to its new long-run equilibrium (point C). Ultimately, the debt
expansion crowds out productive assets and the economy's long-run
consumption per household is correspondingly lower.
Figure 4 illustrates the implications of this adjustment process for
the product and factor markets. The rise in private consumption initially
shifts the NN schedule rightward, increasing employment in nontradables
N N . . . fromnA to n8. At given relative output prices, the resulting expansion in
nontradables can occur only if capital leaves the economy (the Rybczynski
effect). There is therefore an instantaneous fall in the capital stock
(from kA to k) as machines are dismantled and sold for foreign assets.
Since the fall in capital also reduces output of tradables, the economy,
after its initial acquisition of foreign assets, has a current account
deficit.
These effects are reversed in the long run as consumption falls below
its starting level. Employment in nontradables drops to n and the capital
stock therefore rises to kC. Because the economy's overall outside assets
end up being lower, however, the economy must experience a cumulative
current-account deficit in the transition from point A to point C.
Surprisingly, the debt expansion crowds in capital in the long run. This
additional capital is, however, working for foreigners: the economy must
have a higher capital-labor ratio in the long run if it is to produce
enough tradables to service its higher per capita foreign debt. Notice
also that the economy's current-account deficit is higher in the new steady
state.
An anticipated future increase in the per capita public debt is
analyzed in figure 5. When the future policy is announced, there is an
















Consumption rises further until the policy is implemented (point C), after
which consumption declines to its new long-run level (point 0). The
details of this adjustment can be understood with the help of the arguments
applied to the previous case.8
B.Effects of government purchases
The repercussions of changes in government demand depend on the
relation between the domestic time preference rate and the world interest
rate. Consider first a permanent, unanticipated rise in per capita
government demand (measured in tradablea), from g0 to g1 —g0
+Ag.
Because the spending ahift is assumed not to affect the per capita public
debt, it is matched by an equal rise in per capita taxes and ia thua a
balanced-budget policy change. For the moment, there is no need to specify
whether this additional demand falls on traded or nontraded goods.
Figure 6a illuatrates the economy's behavior when r <6,figure 6b its
behavior when r >6.In the first case, national saving rises as
consumption drops from point A to point B: a rise in government spending
causes an even greater drop in private spending, and the economy ends up
(at point C) with a higher stock of outside assets but permanently lower
private consumption. In the second case, however, the initial drop in
private spending falla abort of Ag, so the external surplus shrinks.
Private conaumption declines steadily as the economy makes its transition
to a new steady state at C with lower net national wealth. Only when r and
6 are exactly equal doea government spending crowd out private spending on
a one-for-one basis. When the—0locus is vertical, the economy moves









The dynamics that follow even permanent public spending shifts can be
understood by examining the consumption function. According to equation
(20), a permanent increase g in per capita government spending causes per
capita consumption to change by the (negative) amount
=—[1+(8—r)/RrJg,
which is algebraically less than —g if r <6and algebraically greater
than —g if r >6.Looked at another way, the effect of the fiscal change
on saving depends on the size of the marginal propensity to consume out of
wealth relative to the real interest rate in terms of tradables. The
economic rationale for this result is straightforward. According to
equation (15), each household's consumption is falling over time when r <6
and rising over time when r >6.In the former case, a permanent balanced-
budget spending increase has a greater proportional impact on future
consumption than on present consumption if private saving does not adjust.
Private saving must therefore jump upward immediately to ensure that the
marginal utility of private consumption rises over the future at the rate S
—r.Run in reverse, the same argument shows why private saving falls
immediately when household consumption is rising over time. (The next
section shows that while the case r >6is likely to be the relevant one in
a general-equilibrium context, either of the patterns just described can
arise.)
When the increased government spending fails entirely on traded goods,
the contraction of private consumption implies an immediate fall in
nontraded-sector employment and a rise in the home capital supply.20
Qualitatively, these effects persist in the long run, so capital is again
crowded in.
-Whenincremental government spending falls on nontraded goods, the
initial increase in the capital stock is reduced and ia likely to be
reversed. When r <&the long run fall in private consumption is less than
Ag [equation (21)], so capital is definitely crowded out in the long run
and the foreign asset stock is higher. When r >&the long-run capital
stock is also likely to fall, but need not. Increased government spending
on nontradables clearly leads to greater long-run crowding out of capital
than increaaed government spending on tradables.
The case of an anticipated future increase in government spending can
be analyzed as before. Figure 7 shows how consumption falls initially
(from point A to point B), and how outside assets rise thereafter, until
the fiscal change is implemented (point C). In the case shown in the
figure, private consumption starts by rising from point B but then falls as
the increase in public spending --andthe accompanying rise in taxes --
approaches.Point 0 is the economy's final position.
5. Global effects of fiscal policies
In this section, the preceding small-country analysis is extended to a
global setting. The resulting model shows how fiscal policies in a large
country affect the world interest rate, relative prices, industrial
structurea, and the world capital stock.
A. A two-country world economy
The model studied in previous sections is now modified by the addition






in the preferences of its householdsJ0 The world economy is assumed to
consist of the two similar economies, referred co as Alpha and Beta,
respectively. An additional condition determining the world interest rate
closes the model.
The world interest rate is determined by the equilibrium of the world
capital market. Equation (11) determines the per capita demand for capital
in Alpha and an identical equation determines the per capita demand for
capital in Beta. The world capital market clears when the sum of these per
capita demands equals the sum of the per capita supplies, k° +k:
+k—[2—(nNm+n)]xT(r)+(nN+n)xN[q(r)rJ.





The market-clearing condition (23) shows that the equilibrium world
interest rate can be written as a function of the capital and consumption
aggregates, k° +kand ctm +c,and of the overall government demand for
NaNll
nontradablea, g+g
(24) r —r(ca+c,k° +k,gN +gN$)22
Government purchases of traded soods do not appear in equation (24)
because given privste consumption, changes in such purchases csn be
accommodated through equal opposite changes in the rate of capital
accumulation, with no instantaneous effect on factor markets. The form of
(24) is thus entirely dependent on the assumption that only traded goods
can be transformed into capital.
The appendix reports the partial derivatives of the world interest
rate function (24), but its properties can be understood intuitively.
An increase in world consumption. By increasing world demand for
labor-intensive nontradables, a rise in consumption leads to an excess
supply of capital relative to labor at a given interest rate. A fiiin
the interest rate restores equilibrium by raising the relative price of
nontradables, thereby lowering demand for them, and by encouraging both
sectors to adopt labor-saving production techniques. The rise in
consumption naturally raises demand for traded as well as nontraded goods,
but, once again, the additional demand for tradables can be satisfied out
of a fall in world capital accumulation.
An increase in world capital. A rise in the world ratio of capital t
labor occasions en initial excess supply of capital. A fall in the world
interest rate, however, induces both the tradable and nontradeble sectors
to adopt more capital-intensive techniques. Because q declines when r
declines, demand shifts away from the labor-intensive nontradables sector.
This shift reinforces the equilibration process by reducing the excess
supply of capital relative to labor.
An increase in government demand for nontredables. Again, this
disturbance causes the world interest rate and the relative price of
trsdables to fall.23
Definek*ak°+k, c*ac°+c, gN*agNm+ g. Then the
preceding discussion is summarized by the following partial derivatives:
(25) rc* < 0, r C0, C0.
B. Aggregate dynamics
Since f° =— f$,equations (17) and (18), which apply to both Alpha
and Beta, can be combined to yield laws of motion for world consumption,
c*, and world capital, k*. The analysis is now restricted to the case of
logarithmic consumers (R =1),so that the resulting equations are:
(26) a[r(c*,k*J*)—5]c*—pS[k*+d*],
(27) =[r(c*,k*,g) — + 2w[r(c*,k*,gj —c*—g*,
where d* a dm +dand g* a g° +l2
The matrix of partial derivatives of this system is
(—)





the samesign pattern as in the small-country case.13 The assumption that
thematrix above has one positive and one negative root is insufficient to
ensure local saddlepath stability for the world economy: the disaggregated
underlying system consists of differentialequations involving two
predetermined variables. The roots of the linearized four-equation system28
capital can rise or fall in the long run. Reinforcing the direct negative
effect of higher taxes on consumption is the negative effect of the world
interest rate. The interest rate rises when the policy is implemented, am
it also rises in the long run. The rise in the steady-state interest rate
is obvious in figure llb, where c* and k* both fall in the long run [recaL
(25)]. In figure lla, however, world consumption would be declining at C
if the move from A to C left the interest rate constant [see equation
(26)]. So the long-run interest rate must rise in the case illustrated
there, as well. Notice, though, that in figure lla the interest rate
"overshoots" its eventual level in the short run.
This interest-rate behavior has implications for the international
transmission of expenditure shocks. In the short run private consumption
falls in both countries (recall the assumption that human wealth is
positive). In the likely case that world capital is eventually crowded
out, Alpha's outside assets fall in the long run; its private consumption,
measured in tradables, always falls. (Symmetric initial fiscal positions
are still assumed.) As before, Beta's private consumption and outside
assets can rise or fall in the long run.
Because long-run consumption and outside assets fall by relatively
less in Beta, that country has a relatively smaller share of the world's
capital in the final equilibrium and thus a larger stock of claims on
Alpha. The latter country's external debt ultimately must increase.
The analysis of an increase in public consumption of nontradables ia
somewhat more complicated because the latter variable has a direct effect
on the world interest rate. In particular, the i*— 0locus now shifts
along with the fc* —0locus. Figures l2a and l2b show possible adjustment





considered are small enough that a saddlepath equilibrium still exists
after they occur.
In interpreting the model, it is important to remember that the
dynamics portrayed do not fully capture the underlying evolution of asset
stocks in Alpha and Beta. Imagine, for example, that the world economy is
at its steady state and that both Alpha and Beta are individually in steady
states with constant ratios of external assets to population. A transfer
of external assets from Alpha to Beta will lead to an increased current
account deficit for Beta and an increased surplus for Alpha; but average
world consumption will not change and the world interest rate will not
change. Each country will adjust as in the small-country case --thatis,
at a constant interest rate -- untilboth simultaneously regain external
balance. The world-average dynamics shown in figures 8a and 8b mask the
possibility that adjustment of this sort is going on at the country level.
C. Changes in public debt
A rise in either country's long-run debt ratio raises the
corresponding world magnitude, d*, and thus shifts the —0schedule to
the left. Figure 9 shows how this change affects the world economy.
Average world consumption rises initially (from point A to B) and world
investment falls. In the new steady state (point C), however, the world
capital stock is smaller relative to the labor force than at the original
steady state, and average world consumption is correspondingly lower. Debt
expansion anywhere crowds out capital on a global scale.
An interesting aspect of the adjustment process is that the world
interest rate fgjJ, when consumption initially rises. This fall preserves






demand for labor-intensive nontradables. Of course, the relative price of
nontradables also rises initially in both countries. In the long run,
however, the interest rate ends up above its original level (since both c*
and k* are lower) and the relative price of nontradablea therefore is below
its original level.
Together with the information that the long-run world interest rate
rises, equations (21) and (22) (for the present case R —I)can be used to
deduce the long-run effects of the public debt shock on Alpha and Beta
individually. (This use relies on a aaddlepath condition, —p +r—5 < 0.)
Assume that the shock originates in Alpha, and that fiscal parameters are
initially gj in the two countries. Equation (21) then implies that
steady-state consumption falls by more in Alpha than in Beta, so that ca
must fall in the long run (while c may fall or rise))5
Equation (22), by a similar argument, implies that the steady-state
value of (k +f)°must fall; (k +f)flfalls by less, may rise in the long
run, and must rise if c rises. Since c rises relative to ctm, consumption
of nontradables in Beta rises relative to such consumption in Alpha,
leading to a long-run decline in k relative to k°. k therefore falls
absolutely as well, and ffl must rise, implying an equal fall in fa• If ffi
did not rise, Alpha's outside assets would have to rise relative to Beta's,
a contradiction.
0. Long-run welfare analysis of changes in public debt
Figures lOs and lOb illustrate the steady-state welfare implications
of a higher domestic public debt ratio for an average Alpha consumer. Both
figures assume that Alpha's net foreign claims are initially zero. Each








labor and a given capital stock alter per capita output of nontradables an
per capita output of tradables less the investment per worker needed to
maintain a fixed economy-wide capital-labor ratio.
Figure lOa depicts the case in which Alpha's long-run capital stock
per worker is higher after the disturbance. In the absence of an increase
in the world price of tradables in terms of nontradables, production would
move from point A, downward along the Rybczynski line, to the outer
production possibilities curve. Since tradables are more expensive in the
long run, however, actual production is at B and the economy's income
expansion path is steeper than the initial, broken path. Long-run
equilibrium is at C, where the nontradables market clears. Welfare, shown
by the indifference curve U1J, is below its original level, indicated by
UAUA. An income transfer from future to present generations is implied.
A similar long-run welfare loss occurs in the case shown in figure
lOb, in which Alpha's long-run capital-labor ratio falls. Now, production
shifts from A to B and consumption from A to C. Notice that consumption
point C must always lie to the left of production point B because Alpha hag
become a net debtor to Beta and r > p.
E. Changes in government purchases
The di-stinction between government purchases of traded and nontraded
goods raises takes on additional importance in a global context. Figures
lla and llb show the effects of a permanent balanced-budget increase in
public consumption of tradahles for two alternative configurations of long
run equilibrium.
As in the small-country case, private consumption can fall on impact






capital can rise or fall in the long run. Reinforcing the direct negative
effect of higher taxes on consumption is the negative effect of the world
interest rate. The interest rate rises when the policy is implemented, am
it also rises in the long run. The rise in the steady-state interest rate
is obvious in figure llb, where c* and k* both fall in the long run [recaL
(25)]. In figure lla, however, world consumption would be declining at C
if the move from A to C left the interest rate constant [see equation
(26)]. So the long-run interest rate must rise in the case illustrated
there, as well. Notice, though, that in figure lla the interest rate
"overshoots" its eventual level in the short run.
This interest-rate behavior has implications for the international
transmission of expenditure shocks. In the short run private consumption
falls in both countries (recall the assumption that human wealth is
positive). In the likely case that world capital is eventually crowded
out, Alpha's outside assets fall in the long run; its private consumption,
measured in tradables, always falls. (Symmetric initial fiscal positions
are still assumed.) As before, Beta's private consumption and outside
assets can rise or fall in the long run.
Because long-run consumption and outside assets fall by relatively
less in Beta, that country has a relatively smaller share of the world's
capital in the final equilibrium and thus a larger stock of claims on
Alpha. The latter country's external debt ultimately must increase.
The analysis of an increase in public consumption of nontradables ia
somewhat more complicated because the latter variable has a direct effect
on the world interest rate. In particular, the i*— 0locus now shifts
along with the fc* —0locus. Figures l2a and l2b show possible adjustment














of (i) a rise in government demsnd for nontradables coupled with a private
demand shift away from nontradables such that the two changes together
leave the interest rate (and q) the same for all c* and k*, (ii) a
reversal of the private demand shift. Change (i) is roughly equivalent
(for small changes) to a rise in government purchases of tradables equal in
value (at the initial relative price) to the rise in purchases of
nontradables. Direct calculation shows that change (ii) alone is likely to
depress c* and k* in the long run. In this sense, an increase in gN* --
(i)plus (ii) -- islikely to have a greater crowding-out effect than an
equivalent increase in gT* --thatis, (i) alone.
6. Conclusion
A model of growing world economy peopled by infinitely-lived
households that are not altruistically linked yields some sharp predictions
about how national debt and public spending policies affect global
consumption/production patterns and capital intensity. The results hinge
strongly on the two-sector production structure assumed and on some
additional simplifying assumptions.
Perhaps the most unrealistic of these assumptions is that capital can
be instantaneously shifted between sectors within a country and, indeed,
between countries. The introduction of temporary sector-specificity of
productive factors would alter the model's short-run behavior considerably
and would probably necessitate numerical solution procedures. Most longer-
run predictions of the model would, however, remain qualitatively
unchanged, which is why the model is best viewed as describing medium- to
long-term adjustment. It would also be desirable to allow increased real
exchange rate variation by relaxing the assumption that all tradables,30
wherever produced, are perfect substitutes in consumption. This extension,
like the introduction of factor-movement frictions, may be most relevant to
the model's short-run behavior.16
Also crucial to the simplicity of the model's solution was the
-assumptionof two absolutely identical countries. Such strict symmetry,
while consistent with the Fleclcscher-Ohlin-Samuelson tradition in
international trade theory, prevents the analysis of at least some issues
related to the transfer problem. Another realistic modification would
allow new capital to be produced from existing capital and labor according
to a neoclassical production function [see, for example, Samuelson (1965)].
This change would allow for a more complicated interplay among celative
factor intensities, aggregate demand fluctuations, and investment.
There are at least three other directions in which the present work
could be extended. First, a more detailed welfare analysis of fiscal
policies, perhsps along the lines sketched by Calvo and Obstfeld (1988),
could be a useful component of a normative theory of international fiscal
policy coordination. Romer (1988) has carried out such an analysis for a
small economy, and his results indicate that the welfare effects of fiscal
deficits can be significant even when deviations from Ricardian equivalence
are small (as is possibly true above). Second, the model could be applied
to simulate- the long-run global effects of growing per capita public-debt
levels, as in Tobin (1986). Such simulations would be relevant in
evaluating the economic implications of a political process that fails to
stabilize the ratio of debt to national income. A third extension,
following Frenkel and Razin (l986b), would explore the effects of
alternative budgetary policies when taxation is distortionary.31
Footnotes
1. For related models, generally of small economies, see Engel and Kletzer
(1987), Guidotti (1987), Neary and Purvis (1983), and Razin (1984).
2. International evidence generally supports the assumption that nontraded
goods, taken as an aggregate, are labor intensive relative to tradables.
See, for example, Kravis and Lipsey (1983).
3. To derive this equation, integrate by parts and invoke the condition
lim5, exp[—r(s—t)]d(s) —0,which follows from (13).
4. Given dynamic efficiency (r > js),theinequality —p + (r—6)/R C 0
implies another inequality that was assumed earlier, Cl =r+ (6—r)/R > 0.
To see the link between the first inequality and the signs of aggregate





5. For further discussion, see Weil (1985), Abel (1987), and Buiter
(1988). A two-country version of Blanchard's (1985) model would give
results similar to those found below. Weil's framework seems preferable,
however, for two reasons. First, it is simpler, in that is dispenses with
the analytically inessentiel assumption that death occurs. Second, it
allows discussion of some growth-related questions.
6. Notice that Feldstein's (1976) financing scheme is consistent with
intertemporal budget balance even in a static economy: his suggestion makes
no essential use of the fact of real economic growth, and requires only
that the per capita public debt grow over time at a rate below the interest
rate. For a formal demonstration that this growth pattern of the debt is
consistent with public solvency, see McCallum (1984).
7. Recall that —p + (r—6)/R and (l—R)r —6must be negative (as discussed
in footnote 4).
8. When r < 6 (as in figure 2a), consumption falls after its initial
upward jump.
9. For similar results with R—l, see Puumanen (1986, pp. 63-64).
10. Aoki (1981) has stressed the usefulness of such symmetry assumptions
in analyzing dynamic multi-country models.
11. To be exact, each of these aggregates equals twice the world per
capita level.32
12. Notice that the market for tradables always clears as a result of
Walras's law. Because the nontradables markets in Alpha and Beta clear
[equation (10)], constraint (2]) implies equilibrium in the world
tradables market.
13. Only the assertion that the southwest entry is negative requires some
justification. To see why 2k*/3c* < 0, start by taking the expressions in
the appendix for the Leontief case (xTI =x5'=0),usethe equation
displayed just above (23) to eliminate k*, and invoke a standard result of
the two—sector model, that (r/q)(dq/dr) r(xT —x5)/(rx5+ w). Now
notice that variability of the production technique only reduces
3k*/Bc*, because world production can shift away from tradables when r and
q fall on account of a rise in c*. Strictly speaking, the argument just
given requires that gH*0. This is an artifact of the (somewhat
unsatisfactory) way equation (2]) is specified. With gN* and g* hoth
given and nonzero, the fall in q caused by a rise in c* automatically
implies a. £.iiingT*; thus, world investment could, conceivably, rise.
This possibility is empirically remote enough that it can safely be
ignored.
14. The proof proceeds by writing out the linear approximation to the
four—equation system and using elementary row and column operations to
simplify the associated determinant, which is the product of the system's
characteristic roots.
15. Notice that, r(p+&—r) is decreasing in r (because r>p and r>6 at the
initial equilibrium).
16. See Obstfeld (1988) for a sketch of a model incorporating a variable
real exchange rate.33
Appendix: Partial derivatives of r(c*,k*,g
Equation (23) giving the equilibrium interest rate r can be written as





Thus, r+ < 0; rk —1'rC 0; and =gN*r
< 0.34
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